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Abstract 
Purpose of the study: The objective of the study is to analyze the impact of Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility Quality on Tax Avoidance.  
Methodology: The research is based on secondary data and uses the quantitative method for data analysis. The 
population of this research is the audit report of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK) in the Regency/City 
of West Indonesia with a total of 263 financial statements. The purposive sampling method is used, resulting in 186 
financial statements as samples. Hypotheses are tested using multiple linear regressions using SPSS V.21. 
Main Findings: The results of the research show that Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Quality do not have any influence on Tax Avoidance, Executive Compensation has a positive influence on Tax 
Avoidance, and Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background has a negative influence on Tax Avoidance. 
Thus, it is concluded that the Executive Compensation and Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background 
can significantly influence Tax Avoidance decision making. However; Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Quality do not have any significant influence on Tax Avoidance at manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Applications of this study: This study indicates that good or bad CSR is not able to influence management actions to 
minimize the tax expense. This study can be useful for stakeholders analyzing the company’s CSR disclosure and GCG 
effectiveness and its relation to the company’s activity of tax avoidance.  
Novelty/Originality of this study: Tax avoidance, good corporate governance, and corporate social responsibility are 
included in this study. There are only a few studies that use these variables.  
Keywords: Executive Compensation, Institutional Ownership, Audit Committee, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Quality. 
INTRODUCTION 
The biggest revenue in Indonesia comes from tax. Darmawan & Sukartha, (2014) state that tax is a mandatory 
contribution to the state from the taxpayers without any expectation of receiving direct reciprocal, coercive, and are 
collected based on the law. Revenues from taxes are used by the government to create and improve public welfare. 
Therefore; taxation becomes an important sector which the government considers for achieving higher state revenues. 
The problem arises since the government wants to optimize tax revenue but the company as the taxpayer wants to 
minimize the tax payment since it can reduce the profit (Setyaningrum & Suryarini, 2016). 
However, the state’s revenue from the tax is not maximal. The Finance Minister, Sri Mulyaniadmitted that the trend of 
tax revenue in Indonesia had decreased. The realization of tax revenue is always under the State Budget Target (Buhori, 
2016). Here it is the tax revenue data from 2013 up to 2015: 
Table 1: Realization of the State Budget (Tax Revenue) 
Year Target of State Budget Realization of State Budget  Percentage  
2013 IDR 1,148,364,681,288 IDR 1,077,309,220,752 93.81% 
2014 IDR 1,246,106.955.602 IDR 1,146,863,551,832 92.04% 
2015 IDR 1,488,255,488,129 IDR 1,240,372,331,294 83.29% 
Source: The Ministry of Finance 
Based on Table 1, it shows that tax revenue has not been able to reach the target for those three years. The realization of 
tax revenue reached 93.81% of the budget target in 2013. Then, in 2014 the realization of tax revenue decreased by 
1.77% for 92.04%. And, in 2015 the realization of tax revenue declined by 8.75% for 83.29%. The decrease of tax 
revenue target indicates that tax revenue has not been optimal, it is assumed that the taxpayers do Tax Avoidance. 
Based on the above phenomenon, it shows that there is an indication of Tax Avoidance by individual taxpayers and 
corporate taxpayers. However, the research focuses on corporate taxpayers. According to Mulyani, et.al. (2017) 
companies in Indonesia are indicated to carry out Tax Avoidance seen from the existence of a tax amnesty policy which 
came into force on 1 July 2016 until 31 March 2017. Tax Avoidance by companies shows that Corporate Governance 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 8, No 2, 2020, pp 270-279 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8230 
271 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                        © Kiswanto et al. 
mechanisms do not work effectively and efficiently (Wahyudi, 2015). Those companies are indicated that they do not 
implement the principles of Good Corporate Governance. 
Corporate Governance is a process and a structure used by the corporate to realize the shareholders’ value in the long 
term while taking into account the stakeholders’ interests based on legislation, and ethical values (Sutedi, 2011). 
Larastomo, et.al. (2016) state that the weak implementation of Corporate Governance has more opportunities to do 
deviations; whereas, the good implementation of Corporate Governance can become a boundary for personal interests to 
break the interests of the company. If the company has a well-structured Corporate Governance, it will be directly 
proportional to the company’s compliance in fulfilling its tax obligations (Sartori, 2008).  
The relationship between tax and Corporate Governance has been studied by several researchers with different research 
results. First, Santoso & Muid (2014), Fahreza (2014), and Putri (2017)) state that compensation of commissioners and 
directors has a positive influence on Tax Avoidance. Then, Puspita & Harto (2014), and Azizah & Kusmuriyanto (2016) 
find the different results; tax compensation does not influence Tax Avoidance. Next, the researches are done by 
Merslythalia dan Lasmana (2016), Tjondro, et.al. (2016), and Alviyani (2016)) show that Institutional Ownership has a 
negative influence and it can minimize Tax Avoidance. Then, Fadhilah (2014) and Diantari & Ulupui (2016) find that 
the proportion of Institutional Ownership does not influence Tax Avoidance. 
Robinson, et.al. (2012) find that the Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background has a negative influence 
on Tax Avoidance. While Puspita & Harto (2014) find that the Audit Committee’s Background does do not have any 
influence on Tax Avoidance. Then, the research conducted by Pradipta & Supriyadi (2015), dan Tjondro, et.al. (2016) 
show that CSR Quality has a negative influence on Tax Avoidance. However, Wahyudi (2015) and Wijayanti, et.al. 
(2017) find a different result that shows CSR does not have any influence on Tax Avoidance. 
The various results of those studies show the research gaps. Therefore; it is interesting to research Corporate 
Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility Quality, and Tax Avoidance. The objective of the study is to analyze and 
find the empirical evidence on the influence of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Quality on 
Tax Avoidance. The variables of Corporate Governance used in this study are Executive Compensation, Institutional 
Ownership, and Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theory as the basis of this research is agency theory. It is an agency theory’s research. Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
state that an agency relationship is a contract between the manager (agent) and the owner of the company (principal). 
The authority and responsibility of agents and principals are regulated in the work contract with mutual agreement. In 
the employment contract, the agent has the power to drive the success of the principal’s contracts (Santoso, 2015). The 
company is the intersection point for the contract relationship among the management, owners, creditors, and the 
government (Harahap, 2012). 
Legitimacy theory is one of the theories mentioned in the field of social and environmental accounting. According to 
legitimacy theory, in carrying out its operational activities, the company must be in line with the prevailing values in the 
society (Kiswanto, 2011). The legitimacy theory focuses on the interaction between the company and the community 
(Ghozali & Chariri, 2007). This theory refers to a kind of social contract in which the company is responsible for the 
community’s requests. 
Decision making on Tax Avoidance is in management’s authority. The decision is expected to bring benefits to the 
management as the makers (Hanafi & Harto, 2014). Therefore; executives as operational leaders of the company make 
Tax Avoidance policy because they can also get benefits (Mayangsari, 2015). Giving compensation to executives under 
the Republic of Indonesia Law No. 36 of 2008 is included in the deductible cost; it can be used by management to 
reduce the company’s tax expense. The research conducted by Santoso & Muid (2014), and Mayangsari (2015) prove 
that Executive Compensation has a negative influence on Tax Avoidance. Thus; the first hypothesis of the study is: 
H1: Executive Compensation has a positive influence on Tax Avoidance 
Institutional Ownership is to share ownership owned by insurance companies, banks, mutual funds, and other financial 
institutions (Tarjo, 2008). Institutional investors own the important role to finance the company (Dridi & Boubaker, 
2016). It is expected to be a good control of the company’s performance and activities (Kiswanto, et.al. 2015). Based on 
the agency theory, Institutional Ownership can minimize agency problem/ conflict because it encourages better 
supervision on management’s performance (Sumanto, et.al. 2014).  
Institutional investors can limit managers’ opportunist behavior to prioritize their personal interests. They have the 
ability to analyze financial statements better and they are supported by the large resources, so they can get more 
information (Wardana, 2014). The higher the number of shares held by the institutional investors; the lower the level of 
Tax Avoidance carried out by the company. The research of Merslythalia & Lasmana (2016), and Alviyani (2016) show 
that Institutional Ownership has a negative influence and it can minimize Tax Avoidance. Thus; the second hypothesis 
of the study is: 
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H2: Institutional Ownership has a negative influence on Tax Avoidance 
The audit committee is one of the company’s organs that assist the board of commissioners in terms of supervision on 
the implementation of Corporate Governance. The audit committee also has the responsibility to ensure that the reports 
are in accordance with applicable accounting standards and to supervise the implementation of internal and external 
audits. Therefore; a member of the audit committee must have an accounting or financial expertise background. The 
members of the audit committee who has accounting or financial expertise are having a better understanding of tax 
regulations and how to avoid detection risks (Puspita & Harto, 2014).  
Agency theory states that the audit committee has a supervisory role in company activities to minimize Tax Avoidance. 
The expertise possessed by the audit committee in the field of finance or accounting can detect management actions that 
aim to avoid tax avoidance. The more members of the audit committee who have accounting or financial expertise, the 
lower Tax Avoidance. Then, the researches are done by Armstrong, et.al. (2015), dan Robinson, et.al. (2012) show that 
the Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background negatively influences Tax Avoidance. Thus; the third 
hypothesis of the study is: 
H3: Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background negatively influences Tax Avoidance 
Kuriah & Asyik (2016) defines corporate social responsibility in the process of communicating the social and 
environmental impacts of an organization’s economic activities specially, for the certain groups and generally for the 
community. The assessment of CSR quality is based on the acquisition of CSR awards because it shows that the 
company is serious in implementing CSR programs. Companies with good CSR quality will receive CSR awards from 
both national and international levels. 
Based on the legitimacy theory, one of the efforts which can be done to get positive legitimacy from the community is to 
make ethical and socially responsible actions. The company can get a good reputation from the community by paying 
taxes with full awareness (Siswianti & Kiswanto, 2016). Companies with good quality of CSR will implement CSR 
programs voluntarily and it is based on the community's needs around the company. It will create a good harmonious 
relationship between the company and the surrounding environment. Therefore; a good quality company will think and 
consider again and again making tax avoidance because it can destroy its reputation which has been built through CSR 
activities. Then, the research results of Pradipta & Supriyadi (2015), Lanis & Richardson (2014), dan Tjondro, et.al. 
(2016) show that CSR Quality has a negative influence on Tax Avoidance. Thus; the fourth hypothesis of the study is: 
H4: Corporate Social Responsibility Quality has a negative influence on Tax Avoidance 
Agency theory states that there is a contractual relationship that happens between managers (agents) and shareholders 
(principals). Principals authorize agents to do things in accordance with the principals’ interests. So that the principal is 
only obliged to provide facilities and capital, while the agent is obliged to manage the company. The boundary between 
the principal and the agent creates the agency problem because the agent has more access to get information about the 
condition of the company than the principal. 
The company’s management action, especially in terms of Tax Avoidance, is related to the agency problems. The 
agency problem can be solved by implementing Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance is presented through the 
giving of Executive Compensation, doing institutional investors’ supervision and selecting audit committees who have 
accounting or financial expertise. Providing Executive Compensation can motivate management to make Tax Avoidance 
decisions. Then, the presence of institutional investors and audit committees who have accounting or financial expertise 
can supervise and control management in making decisions. Those actions can eliminate Tax Avoidance. 
Tax Avoidance can also be influenced by CSR Quality. The implementation of CSR is a socially responsible action but 
Tax Avoidance is socially irresponsible (Wahyudi, 2015). The legitimacy theory states that companies try to get positive 
legitimacy from the community so the sustainability of their business is maintained. It can be implemented with CSR 
activities and tax payments. Companies with good CSR activities will get awards. Thus; the fifth hypothesis of the study 
is: 
H5: Executive Compensation, Institutional Ownership, Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility Quality simultaneously have a significant influence on Tax Avoidance 
The research framework can be described in figure 1. 
METHODOLOGY  
This research used a quantitative approach with secondary data. Multiple regressions were performed using SPSS V.21. 
The population of this study 150 companies. They are all manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) from 2013 up to 2015. The samples are taken by purposive sampling with the following criteria. 
 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 8, No 2, 2020, pp 270-279 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8230 
273 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                        © Kiswanto et al. 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
Table 2: Criteria of sample selection 
Criteria Numbers of 
Unselected 
companies 
Numbers of 
Selected 
companies 
The manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange  
 150 
1. Companies which publish a full annual report 
from 2013 up to 2015 
(27) 123 
2. Companies which do not get losses during the 
study period 
(58) 65 
3. Companies with their annual reports consisting 
of the needed information (data) of the research 
(27) 38 
Total observations at the annual report from 2013 
up to 2015 
 114 
The numbers of outlier data excluded from the 
samples 
 (27) 
Total analysis units  87 
Source: The processed secondary data in 2017 
Here they are the operational definitions of each variable as presented on table 3 below: 
Table 3: Operational Descriptions of Research Variables 
 
No. Variable Definition Measurement 
1. Executive 
Compensation 
(X1) 
Executive Compensation is an award in the 
form of material or non-material given to 
executives for being better performance 
achieving the company’s goals (Dewi & 
Sari, 2015). 
Natural logarithms of total 
Executive Compensation 
(Zulma, 2016). 
2. Institutional 
Ownership (X2) 
Institutional Ownership is the ownership of 
the shares by the institution of all 
outstanding shares (Zatun & Kiswanto, 
2015). 
The comparison between the 
number of institutional 
shares and the number of 
outstanding shares (Dewi & 
Jati, 2014) 
3. Audit committee 
with finance or 
accounting 
background (X3) 
The audit committee is an additional 
committee to assist the board of 
commissioners in carrying out supervision 
and internal control of the company so 
information asymmetry does not happen. It 
can create more effective and efficient 
company performance (Zatun & Kiswanto, 
2015). 
The comparison between the 
number of audit committees 
who have accounting or 
financial background and the 
total audit committee 
(Robinson, et.al. 2012). 
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4. Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Quality (X4) 
Corporate social responsibility is the 
company's commitment to participate in 
sustainable economic development to 
improve the quality of life and the 
environment which benefits the company 
itself, the local community, and the 
community (Siswianti & Kiswanto, 2016). 
If the company receives a 
CSR award, it is valued at 1 
and if it does not receive any 
award, it is valued at 0 
(Tjondro, et.al. 2016). 
5. Tax Avoidance 
(Y) 
Tax Avoidance is any effort made to 
reduce tax expense (Puspita & Harto, 
2014). 
Comparison between tax 
expense and pre-tax profit 
(Gaaya, et.al. 2017). 
Source: Processed secondary data, 2018 
 
To simplify the interpretation of the results, the ETR value of the study is multiplied by negative one (-1) denoted by Y. 
It means the higher the value of Y, the higher the value of Tax Avoidance made by the company (Francis, et.al. 2013). 
The data are collected by documentation on annual reports and audited financial statements of manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period of 2013 up to 2015. Then, data are analyzed by descriptive 
statistics and multiple linear regressions using SPSS version 21. Multiple linear regression analysis is used to know the 
magnitude influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Before hypothesis testing is carried out, the 
classic assumption tests are done consisting of normality test, multicollinearity test, autocorrelation test, and 
heteroscedasticity test.  
DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS  
Descriptive statistics are used to provide an explanation of the minimum value, maximum value, average value and 
standard deviation. The results of descriptive statistical analysis can be seen in table 4 and table 5 below: 
Table 4: The Results of Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
ETR 87 -0.5456 -0.0028 -0.2799 0.09656 
Executive Compensation 87 17.6129 25.9175 23.0194 1.49501 
Institutional Ownership 87 0.0037 0.5654 0.1915 0.14793 
Audit Committee 87 0.25 1.00 0.7516 0.25943 
Valid N (listwise) 87     
Source: Output SPSS of processed secondary data, 2017 
Table 5: The Results of the Descriptive Test on CSR Quality 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0 77 88.5 88.5 88.5 
1 10 11.5 11.5 100.0 
Total 87 100.0 100.0  
Source: The Output SPSS of the processed secondary data, 2017 
Table 4 shows that there are 87 analysis units (N) with the average value of Tax Avoidance is-0.2799. It means that the 
average tax expense borne by manufacturing companies is 27.99% of pre-tax profit. The average value of the Executive 
Compensation variable is 23.0194. The average value of Institutional Ownership is 0.1915; it means that the mean of 
institutional investors own the outstanding shares of manufacturing companies is 19.15%. 
The average value of the audit committee is 0.7516 or 75.16%. It indicates that the manufacturing company has fulfilled 
the rules in the Decree of the Chairman of the Capital Market Supervisory Agency No: KEP-643 / BL / 2012 which 
requires that one member of the audit committee having accounting or finance background. The results of descriptive 
statistics in table 5 show that the number of analysis unit which receives a CSR award during the study year is 10 units 
or 11.5%. It means that manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have low-quality CSR. 
Furthermore; before testing the hypotheses, data are analyzed by classic assumption tests consisting of normality, 
linearity, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity tests as seen in table 6 below: 
Table 6: The Results of Classic Assumption Tests 
Classic Assumption Tests Results Requirements Notes 
Normality 0.062 Sig > 0.05 Normal distributed 
Multicollinierity 
Tolerance> 0.1 and 
VIF < 10 
Tolerance value> 0.10 and 
VIF < 10 
Free of Multicollinierity 
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Autocorrelation 0.915 Sig > 0.05 Free of Autocorrelation 
Heteroscedasticity 18.53<112.40 C count < C table Free of Heteroscedasticity 
Source: The Output SPSS of processed secondary data, 2017 
Based on the results of the regression test, the regression equation of the study is: 
Y = -0.509 + 0.014X1 – 0.121X2 – 0.097X3 + 0.009X4 
The constant value is 0.509, it means if all independent variables including Executive Compensation (X1), Institutional 
Ownership (X2), Audit committee with finance or accounting background (X3), and CSR Quality (X4) are 0 as the value 
or constant, then Tax Avoidance is 0.509. The regression coefficient of Executive Compensation (X1) is 0.014 and 
positive; it means that if Executive Compensation increases 1%, then Tax Avoidance will increase 0.014. The regression 
coefficient of the Institutional Ownership variable (X2) is 0.121 and negative. It means that if institutional Ownership 
increases 1%, Tax Avoidance decreases 0.121. 
The regression coefficient of the audit committee's background on accounting or finance (X3) is 0.097 and negative. It 
means that if X3 increases 1%, Tax Avoidance decreases 0.097. The regression coefficient of CSR quality variable (X4) 
is 0.009 and positive. It means if CSR Quality experiences increase 1%, Tax Avoidance increases 0.009. 
The value of the adjusted R square is 0.15. It means that 15% of Tax Avoidance is influenced by Executive 
Compensation, Institutional Ownership, Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background, and CSR Quality. 
Then, 85% of Tax Avoidance is influenced by other variables that are not examined in the study. The error of the 
Estimate standard is 0.0890197. The smaller the Standard Error of the Estimate standard, the more precise the regression 
model in predicting the independent variable. The summary of hypotheses tests can be seen in table 7. 
Table 7: The Results of Regression Test 
No. Hypothesis Β Α Sig. Results 
1 H1 : Executive Compensation has a positive 
influence on Tax Avoidance 
0.014 0.05 0.033 Accepted 
2 H2 : Institutional Ownership has a negative influence 
on Tax Avoidance 
-0.121 0.05 0.073 Rejected 
3 H3: Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting 
Background has a negative influence on Tax 
Avoidance 
-0.097 0.05 0.013 Accepted 
4 H4 : CSR Quality has a negative influence on Tax 
Avoidance 
0.009 0.05 0.759 Rejected 
5 H6: Executive Compensation, Institutional 
Ownership, Audit Committee with Finance or 
Accounting Background, and CSR Quality 
simultaneously influence Tax Avoidance 
 0.05 0.002 Accepted 
Source: The Output of SPSS 21 in 2017 
The Influence of Executive Compensation on Tax Avoidance 
The result shows that Executive Compensation has a positive influence on Tax Avoidance; it is in line with researches 
done by Putri (2017), Fahreza (2014), Santoso & Muid (2014), and Mayangsari (2015). It means that the compensation 
system applied by the company can motivate corporate executives to make a Tax Avoidance decision. The higher the 
level of compensation given to the executive, the higher the level of Tax Avoidance. 
The results of descriptive statistics show that providing compensation to executives of manufacturing companies is 
relatively high. 45 or 51.72% of manufacturing companies have high executive compensation at intervals of 22.62 to 
24.28. Then, for the distribution of tax avoidance; 41 analysis units are in the high category with an interval of 0.2557 to 
0.1591. Thus; it can be identified that companies with high executive compensation are to do tax avoidance. 
The results of the study support agency theory which states that principals delegate authority to agents to manage 
companies, then principals can get prosperity and profit. It is normal when the agent expects to get compensation for his 
works. One of the efforts done by the agent to realize the principal expects to minimize the corporate cost; including the 
tax expense. So, it can be understood that giving high compensation to executives will motivate them to do Tax 
Avoidance. 
The Influence of Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance 
Institutional Ownership does not influence Tax Avoidance. It means that the size of the shares owned by the institution 
is not able to influence the company in carrying out Tax Avoidance. It is because 33 or 37.93% of the analysis units have 
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low Institutional Ownership at intervals of 0.0037 to 0.1160. Consequently, institutional investors have less contribution 
to controlling and decision making at the company. 
The result of the study is in line with the studies done by Diantari & Ulupui (2016), Fadhilah (2014), and Dewi & Jati 
(2014) which state that Institutional Ownership does not influence Tax Avoidance. According to Diantari & Ulupui, 
(2016) institutional investors are not able to provide good control over opportunistic management’s actions on Tax 
Avoidance. It is because institutional investors may entrust the supervision and management of the company to the board 
of commissioners as one of their jobs. Thus; the existence of institutional investors does not have any influence on tax 
avoidance. 
The result of the study does not support the agency theory of Jensen & Meckling(1976) which state that Institutional 
Ownership will control agency problem/ conflicts by putting pressure on managers to work better. Institutional investors 
can encourage more optimal supervision of management’s performance. However; the fact shows a different situation; 
institutional investors do not work optimally to control the management. Based on the findings at manufacturing 
companies, institutional investors lack the power to regulate policies on companies because the majority of shareholders 
are controlled by holding companies and managerial ownership. 
The Influence of Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background on Tax Avoidance 
The audit committee is one of the organs at the company assisting independent commissioners to do the supervision and 
internal control. Based on the Decision of the Chairman of the Capital Market Supervisory Agency No: KEP-
643/BL/2012 on competence and professionalism, it requires public companies to have audit committees. An audit 
committee chaired by an independent commissioner and the members can be the commissioners and/ or professional 
businessman from outside the company with one member having an accounting or finance background. Audit 
Committee with Finance or Accounting Background will understand the gap in tax regulations and they can find ways to 
avoid detection risks (Puspita & Harto, 2014). 
The research is in line with studies done by Armstrong, et.al. (2015) dan Robinson, et.al. (2012) which state that Audit 
Committee with Finance or Accounting Background negatively influences Tax Avoidance. Audit committees with 
accounting or financial background will reduce management opportunities to do tax avoidance because they can 
understand accounting and taxation and they can monitor management activities within the company. It shows that 
companies that have an audit committee with accounting or financial background will be more responsible in presenting 
financial statements. 
The result of the study is in line with agency theory which states that the supervisory function possessed by the audit 
committee is able to suppress the opportunist actions of managers in tax avoidance. The existence of an audit committee 
can protect the shareholders’ interests from the management’s opportunistic actions (Dwiharyadi, 2017).  
The Influence of Quality Corporate Social Responsibility on Tax Avoidance 
CSR Quality does not influence Tax Avoidance in a negative direction. It means that good or bad CSR quality of a 
company does not guarantee that the company does not carry out Tax Avoidance. It is because the company does not 
want to lose its reputation. Therefore; companies carry out CSR programs only to fulfill the obligations. Consequently, 
sometimes CSR programs are not adjusted to the needs of the community and the surrounding environment. 
The result of the study is in line with researches done by Lionita & Kusbandiyah (2017), Wijayanti, et.al.(2017), and 
Wahyudi (2015) who find that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) does not influence Tax Avoidance. The 
researchers suspect that the insignificance of CSR for Tax Avoidance due to measurements of CSR using dummy 
variables; it is recipients of CSR awards. The company which gets CSR award already have sustainable CSR programs 
so their routine programs are not influenced by the amount of tax paid for the year (Tjondro, et.al. 2016). Therefore; it is 
suggested for the next research to explore it by using a cost approach, it is the cost of CSR issued by the company to 
reflect the company’s efforts to minimize the tax expense. 
Legitimacy theory states that companies try to get positive legitimacy from the public to maintain the survival of the 
company through the implementation of CSR programs, one of the programs is paying taxes according to the provisions. 
Thus; companies that try to minimize the tax expense are considered as the socially-irresponsible companies. However; 
the fact shows that good Corporate Social Responsibility Quality does not guarantee that the company does not carry out 
Tax Avoidance. 
The Influence of Executive Compensation, Institutional Ownership, Audit Committee with Finance or 
Accounting Background, and Corporate Social Responsibility Quality on Tax Avoidance 
Based on the result of hypothesis testing, it can be concluded that Executive Compensation, Institutional Ownership, 
Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background, and Corporate Social Responsibility Quality simultaneously 
influence Tax Avoidance. The fifth hypothesis of the study is accepted. This study comprehensively proves that the high 
compensation rates, the low proportion of Institutional Ownership, the high number of audit committees with accounting 
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or financial background, and poor quality of CSR give a contribution to manufacturing companies to avoid tax 
avoidance.  
Executive Compensation is successful in supporting agency theory which states that agents as parties who are authorized 
to manage the company tend to take action to prioritize their personal interests. Then, the role of the Audit Committee as 
a supervisor can narrow down the opportunities for management to minimize the tax expense. However; Institutional 
Ownership does not fit agency theory because as a supervisory tool in Corporate Governance mechanisms; it is unable to 
work properly to prevent companies from Tax Avoidance. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the results of the study and discussion, it can be concluded that the Executive Compensation and Audit 
Committee with Finance or Accounting Background influences Tax Avoidance. Whereas; Institutional Ownership and 
CSR quality do not have any influence on Tax Avoidance. Then, Executive Compensation, Institutional Ownership, 
Audit Committee with Finance or Accounting Background, and CSR Quality simultaneously influence Tax Avoidance. 
The result of the study indicates that good or bad CSR is not able to influence management actions to minimize the tax 
expense. Therefore; for further research, it can consider measuring CSR using the cost approach. Furthermore; the next 
researchers can consider the size of the board in the company which can also influence the amount of compensation 
issued by the company. 
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD 
Limitation of this the result of the study indicates that good or bad CSR is not able to influence management actions to 
minimize the tax expense. Therefore; for further research, it can consider measuring CSR using the cost approach. 
Furthermore; the next researchers can consider the size of the board in the company which can also influence the amount 
of compensation issued by the company. 
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